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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts 
1515 Market Street, Suite 1414 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 Counsel for Judge Bradley P. Lunsford 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
It is a longstanding principle that the federal courts 
“have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” Cohens 
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). But in 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court 
recognized “a far-from-novel exception to this general rule,” 
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), which it expanded in 
subsequent decisions. Under the Court’s Younger 
jurisprudence, federal courts are obligated to abstain from 
exercising their jurisdiction where it would interfere with 
“state criminal prosecutions,” certain “civil enforcement 
proceedings,” or “civil proceedings involving certain orders 
that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 
perform their judicial functions.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., 
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (“NOPSI”) 
(1989). 
 4 
In this case, Harry Hamilton seeks declaratory and 
injunctive relief from an alleged conspiracy to deprive him of 
contact with his son. But because he now has custody of his 
son subject to pending state-court proceedings, the District 
Court opined that this case could be moot and dismissed it on 
Younger abstention grounds. Although the District Court 
erred in dismissing this case under Younger before resolving 
whether it is moot—a federal court can abstain from 
exercising its jurisdiction only if it has jurisdiction to abstain 
from—we find that Hamilton’s custody of his son has mooted 
his case. We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal on that alternate ground. 
I 
Since 2004, Harry Hamilton and his ex-wife, Sherrilyn 
Washington, have fought in state court for custody of their 
son, S.H. This case originates from that dispute, centering on 
a three-week period in 2014 when Hamilton had partial 
custody of S.H. and S.H. accused Washington of abusing 
him.  
A 
 On November 7, 2014, S.H. fled from Washington’s 
home to Hamilton’s claiming that he had been abused by her. 
Hamilton filed a motion in the Centre County Court of 
Common Pleas for a temporary order giving him full custody 
of S.H. And after S.H. stayed with Hamilton over the 
weekend, Washington filed a petition for emergency custody, 
alleging that S.H was with Hamilton without her consent.  
That same day, Common Pleas Judge Bradley 
Lunsford granted Washington’s petition for emergency 
custody and authorized the police to enforce his order. 
Concurrently, S.H. was referred to Centre County’s Children 
and Youth Services (“CYS”) due to S.H.’s abuse allegations. 
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CYS concluded that the alleged incident did not meet the 
definition of child abuse. But it spoke with Washington—who 
maintained that Hamilton was influencing S.H.—and S.H.—
who stated that he did not feel safe with Washington. CYS 
continued its investigation, giving S.H. the option of moving 
into a group home or remaining with his mother. S.H. 
continued to tell CYS that he did not want to stay with her. So 
CYS advised placing S.H. in a group home called Youth 
Haven.  
On November 13, Washington arranged for S.H. to be 
placed in Youth Haven. At the time, she objected to S.H. 
being able to contact Hamilton, claiming that she had sole 
custody of S.H. Over her objection, CYS recommended 
allowing S.H. to contact Hamilton and Youth Haven agreed 
to facilitate that contact. The night S.H. moved in, Hamilton 
called S.H. The next day, he delivered clothes for S.H. And 
during the week that followed, he regularly spoke with S.H. 
on the phone. On November 16, Hamilton visited S.H. During 
that visit, he noticed several conditions that concerned him, 
including that S.H. was subject to search by staff, 
disproportionately assigned chores, and placed in a ground 
level room that lacked blinds. He shared his concerns with 
Youth Haven, which told CYS that S.H. could not stay there 
due to problems that had occurred during Hamilton’s visit. To 
facilitate S.H.’s stay in Youth Haven, Nicole Bromley, a CYS 
employee, informed Hamilton that he could no longer contact 
S.H. at Youth Haven. 
B 
 On November 24, 2014, Hamilton filed a pro se suit in 
federal district court against Nicole Bromley, CYS and 
certain of its employees, Youth Haven and certain of its 
employees, and Judge Lunsford. In his complaint, he sought 
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declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Defendants 
conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights by 
“placing S.H. in a shelter tantamount to confinement” and 
“arbitrarily and capriciously terminating all paternal visits and 
contact.” App. 17-18. Separately, Hamilton sought a 
temporary restraining order, which was denied. The District 
Court referred the case to a magistrate judge for pretrial 
management and resolution of all dispositive motions.  
While Hamilton’s federal case progressed, custody 
proceedings also continued in Pennsylvania state court. On 
November 25, CYS updated Judge Lunsford on its abuse 
investigation; on November 28, S.H. left Youth Haven; and 
on December 2, Judge Lunsford recused himself. Eventually, 
Clinton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Michael 
Williamson took over the state case. And in April 2015, he 
entered an order that vacated Judge Lunsford’s prior 
emergency custody order, granted Hamilton physical custody 
of S.H., and prohibited contact between S.H. and 
Washington. 
On May 5, 2015, the magistrate judge in Hamilton’s 
federal case learned that Hamilton regained physical custody 
of S.H. and issued an order for Hamilton to show cause why 
the case should not be dismissed on abstention or mootness 
grounds. The magistrate judge subsequently issued a Report 
and Recommendation (“R&R”) advising dismissal of 
Hamilton’s complaint under Younger. In so recommending, 
the magistrate judge noted that it was “unable to make . . . a 
determination” as to whether Hamilton’s case was moot. 
Hamilton v. Bromley, 2015 WL 4077591, at *5 n.2 (M.D. Pa. 
July 2, 2015). The District Court adopted the R&R and 
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dismissed this case on July 2, 2015. This timely appeal 
followed.1  
II 
Although the constitutional elements of both our 
jurisdiction and the District Court’s jurisdiction are at issue in 
this case, the statutory elements are not. The District Court 
had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over a trial court’s ruling on 
mootness, Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 819 F.3d 61, 63-
64 (3d Cir. 2016), and its determination of whether Younger 
abstention is proper. Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of 
Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Our review of 
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is also plenary. 
Weitzner, 819 F.3d at 63. 
III 
On appeal, Hamilton argues that the District Court 
erred in dismissing this case. He maintains that the District 
Court improperly abstained under Younger and that his case 
has not been mooted by the fact that he has regained full 
custody of S.H. In responding to Hamilton’s argument, the 
sequence in which we address mootness and abstention is 
critical as “[m]ootness is a jurisdictional question” that 
derives from Article III of the Constitution, North Carolina v. 
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971), whereas Younger abstention 
is not. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986) (“[Younger abstention] does 
                                              
1 Pro bono counsel has represented Hamilton on 
appeal. We express our gratitude to counsel for accepting this 
matter pro bono and for the quality of counsel’s 
representation.   
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not arise from lack of jurisdiction . . . but from strong policies 
counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where 
particular kinds of state proceedings have already been 
commenced.”). 
Because federal courts “have an independent 
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction 
exists,” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), 
and because the “statutory and (especially) constitutional 
elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of 
separation and equilibration of powers,” Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998), “Article III 
jurisdiction is always an antecedent question.” Id. Thus a 
court cannot abstain under Younger unless it concludes that it 
has Article III jurisdiction to abstain from. See, e.g., Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977) (noting that the Court was 
“first obliged to examine the standing of appellees, as a 
matter of the case-or-controversy requirement associated with 
Art. III” before addressing Younger); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc.,  481 U.S. 1, 23 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“There 
is no occasion to decide if abstention would have been proper 
unless the District Court had jurisdiction.”); Sansotta v. Town 
of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 548 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] 
district court can abstain only when it has . . . jurisdiction.”).  
In this case, the District Court dismissed Hamilton’s 
case under Younger before concluding whether it is moot. 
And in failing to consider if it had Article III jurisdiction first, 
the District Court erred. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 
(“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a 
threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the 
judicial power of the United States and is . . . without 
exception.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
To avoid that same error, we will analyze mootness first even 
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though the District Court dismissed this case on Younger 
abstention grounds. 
A 
Though federal courts have a “virtually unflagging 
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” 
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976), Article III of the Constitution 
limits the federal judiciary’s authority to exercise its “judicial 
Power” to resolving “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. 
Const. Art. III, § 2. This case-or-controversy limitation is 
“essential to our system of separated powers,” Toll Bros., Inc. 
v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009), by 
“ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the proper—and 
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.” 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). And we enforce it 
“through the several justiciability doctrines that cluster about 
Article III,” including “standing, ripeness, mootness, the 
political-question doctrine, and the prohibition on advisory 
opinions.” Toll Bros., 555 F.3d at 137 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
As the parties agree, the fact that Hamilton has 
regained custody of S.H. implicates mootness, a doctrine that 
“ensures that the litigant’s interest in the outcome continues 
to exist throughout the life of the lawsuit,” Freedom from 
Religion Found. Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 
832 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), and is “concerned with the court’s ability to grant 
effective relief.” Cty. of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 
F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001). Under our precedent, a case is 
moot if “developments occur during the course of 
adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the 
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outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant 
the requested relief.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 
F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Like most rules, mootness has exceptions and “when a 
litigant is unable to meet the requirements of the general 
mootness inquiry, the litigant may invoke an exception to the 
mootness doctrine to gain judicial review.” Chong v. Dist. 
Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2001). One exception is 
when “secondary or ‘collateral’ injuries survive after 
resolution of the primary injury”; another is when “the 
defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but 
is free to resume it at any time.” Id. Other exceptions to 
mootness include when “the issue is deemed a wrong capable 
of repetition yet evading review” or the case is “a properly 
certified class action suit.” Id. 
Because the illegal conduct of which Hamilton 
complains—being separated from his son and deprived of 
contact with him—is no longer occurring, he must invoke an 
exception to mootness to gain judicial review. He has not 
requested damages and because equitable relief “is available 
only so long as there is an actual controversy among the 
parties,” Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. New Jersey, 772 
F.2d 35, 40 (3d Cir. 1985), and because “[p]ast exposure to 
illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 
controversy regarding [equitable] relief . . . if unaccompanied 
by any continuing, present adverse effects,” O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974), neither a 
declaratory judgment nor an injunction is available here. 
Relying on our decision in Winston by Winston v. 
Children & Youth Servs. of Delaware Cty., 948 F.2d 1380 (3d 
Cir. 1991), Hamilton claims his past injury is capable of 
repetition yet evading review because there is a reasonable 
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expectation that he “will again be subject to the same 
unlawful limitations on his parental rights.” Hamilton Br. 37. 
We disagree. The capable-of-repetition doctrine is a narrow 
exception that “applies only in exceptional situations” where 
“(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be 
fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is 
a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will 
be subject to the same action again.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 
U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (brackets and internal quotation marks 
omitted). And though we agree with Hamilton that the fluid 
nature of custody proceedings can make situations like his too 
short litigate before a change in circumstances, we cannot 
find a “reasonable expectation” or “demonstrated probability” 
that the “same controversy will recur” here. Murphy v. Hunt, 
455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982).  
First, circumstances have changed dramatically since 
this case was filed: a new judge is presiding over the divorce-
and-custody proceedings; Hamilton has had physical custody 
of S.H. for over two years; S.H. is approximately sixteen 
years old; and the most recent custody order prohibits contact 
between S.H. and Washington unless S.H. desires to speak 
with her. Any one of these changes could have made a 
significant difference when CYS recommended S.H.’s 
placement at Youth Haven—particularly the shift in custody 
from Washington, who was alleged to have abused S.H., to 
Hamilton, who was not—making it unlikely that Hamilton 
“will once again be faced with the restrictions . . . that are the 
subject of this lawsuit.” Winston, 948 F.2d at 1384.  
Second, the “conduct complained of was . . . 
necessarily predicated on the unique features of [a] particular 
series of [events]” and “[n]othing on this record apprises us of 
the likelihood of a similar chain of events.” New Jersey Tpk. 
Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 33 (3d Cir. 
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1985). Before Hamilton is subject to the same restrictions on 
his parental rights that were imposed in 2014, there would 
need to be (1) some strife between child and father or father 
and mother (2) that CYS got involved in. And at that point, 
CYS would (3) need to encourage and convince S.H. to stay 
in a group home while mediating that dispute and (4) the 
shelter would have to deprive Hamilton of access to S.H. On 
this record, it is too speculative that any one of those actions 
would occur—let alone all four—and more than speculation 
is required to invoke the capable-of-repetition exception. See 
id. (“‘Capable of repetition’ is not a synonym for ‘mere 
speculation;’ it is a substantive term on which the moving 
party must provide a reasonable quantity of proof—perhaps 
even by the preponderance of the evidence.”).   
Finally, our decision in Winston does not suggest 
otherwise. In that case, a child was placed in CYS’s 
protective custody after his father was arrested on a drug 
charge and his mother was transported to the hospital for 
intoxication. 948 F.2d at 1382. CYS limited the parents’ 
visitation rights during that protective custody and the parents 
sued to challenge those limitations as unconstitutional. Id. 
When the father regained custody, CYS moved to dismiss the 
complaint for mootness. On appeal, we found that the dispute 
was capable of repetition yet evading review noting that: 
[W]e cannot share the dissent’s optimism that there is 
no reasonable expectation that the family unit, 
composed as it is of two parents who have a history of 
drug use, will not experience another breakdown 
requiring CYS to retake temporary custody of Samuel 
Jr. In fact, as appellants have noted, legal custody was 
returned to the parents only subject to conditions 
which, if not complied with, could subject them to a 
repeat of the situation which precipitated this lawsuit. 
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Id. at 1384.  
Unlike in Winston, Hamilton’s custody is not subject 
to monitoring conditions. Unlike in Winston, where both 
parents had a history of drug abuse, only one parent has been 
alleged to have abused S.H. and that parent lacks custody of 
him. And unlike in Winston, Hamilton is not challenging a 
specific state policy that would apply to any future custody 
dispute. These distinctions are critical—in Winston, all that 
was required for the parents to be subject to “a repeat of the 
situation which precipitated th[eir] lawsuit,” id., was for one 
of them to use drugs again, whereas the same limitations on 
Hamilton’s parental rights could not recur absent the chain of 
events discussed above and despite the shift in custody to a 
parent with no history of abusing S.H. Consequently, while 
there is a “theoretical possibility” that S.H. will again be 
placed in a group home where Hamilton cannot contact him, 
that possibility is not enough to invoke the capable-of-
repetition exception. Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482. Because the 
case is moot and no mootness exception applies, it is not 
justiciable and the District Court should have dismissed it on 
that basis. 
B2 
Since we lack Article III jurisdiction over this case, we 
cannot resolve whether Younger abstention is appropriate 
because a “judicial decision rendered in the absence of a case 
or controversy is advisory, and federal courts lack power to 
render advisory opinions.” United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 
165, 168 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare 
                                              
2 Judge Hardiman joins the opinion except as to 
Section III.B. 
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the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and 
dismissing the cause.”). But because the opinion below 
contains an uncontested error, we believe the District Court’s 
Younger analysis warrants comment.  
In dismissing this case on Younger grounds, the 
District Court relied on a non-precedential opinion of this 
Court to hold that “[u]nder Younger, abstention is proper if: 
(1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) the proceeding 
implicates an important state interest; and (3) the state 
proceeding affords the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to 
raise federal claims.” Hamilton, 2015 WL 4077591, at *4 
(citing Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 F. App’x 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
Notably, it did not consider the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sprint, nor did it consider our recent precedential opinions 
examining Sprint. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n 
of New York Harbor, 755 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2014); ACRA 
Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2014).  
These three factors the District Court relied on in 
justifying abstention originate in Middlesex Cty. Ethics 
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). But 
the Supreme Court explained in Sprint that the “three 
Middlesex conditions . . . [a]re not dispositive,” 134 S. Ct. at 
593, because “Younger extends” only to “the three 
‘exceptional circumstances’ identified in NOPSI,” id. at 594, 
including: (1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions”; (2) 
“certain civil enforcement proceedings”; and (3) “pending 
civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in the 
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial 
functions.” Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
considering only the three Middlesex factors, the District 
Court committed the same error that the Supreme Court 
faulted the Eighth Circuit with making in Sprint. And while 
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that error may be understandable—as we noted in ACRA Turf 
Club, “most courts strictly and mechanically applied the 
three-part test from Middlesex” between NOPSI and Sprint, 
748 F.3d at 135—Sprint makes clear that the Middlesex 
factors are only relevant in assessing whether Younger 
abstention is proper after a court identifies one of the three 
categories of proceedings identified in NOPSI. By not 
applying the correct test for Younger abstention, the District 
Court erred. And this was an error irrespective of whether 
Younger abstention is appropriate here—an issue we cannot 
opine on. 
IV 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of this case on the alternate ground 
that Hamilton’s claims are moot. 
